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INTRODUCTION
This case involves claims for easement by necessity and reformation of deeds.
The Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust (the "Abraham Trust") appeals from the trial
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered March 8, 2010 herein, finding
Abraham Trust has no easement, right-of-way, or means of access between a parcel of
real property located in Kane County, State of Utah, and an adjacent public road; further,
from the court's entry of judgment based on its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
entered April 21, 2010; finally, from the court's denial of Abraham Trust's Motion for
New Trial, dated January 1, 2011. Abraham Trust's Notice of Appeal was filed with the
trial court on January 4, 2011. An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed January 24,
2011.
The trial court's Findings and Conclusions, Judgment and Order Denying Motion
for New Trial all followed a bench trial in this matter on January 26, 2010. Thereafter,
the trial court found Abraham Trust failed to establish a case for easement by necessity,
failing to establish the element of necessity at the time of severance. The court concluded
Abraham Trust failed to produce competent evidence establishing its remote grantors'
intent to place the reservation of easement on Abraham Trust's property and those
properties lying between Abraham Trust's property and the adjacent county road. Upon
entry of final judgment by the trial court on Wednesday, April 21, 2010, Abraham Trust
filed a Motion for New Trial under Rule 59, Utah R. Civ. P., which was filed with the
3
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Court on May 5, 2010. After briefing and argument, the court issued an order denying
the Motion for New Trial as having been untimely filed. If the Motion for New Trial was
untimely, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal which was thus also untimely
filed.
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR APPEAL
This is an appeal from a final order and judgment of the Sixth Judicial District
Court for Kane County, State of Utah, denying Abraham Trust's request for easement
rights across Park's property to the adjacent county road. Appeal was initially taken to
the Supreme Court for the State of Utah, which thereafter assigned the matter to the Utah
Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction obtains pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
However, Park asserts the Notice of Appeal was untimely and therefore this Court lacks
jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled Abraham Trust's Motion for New Trial was
Untimely. A trial court's ruling on a Motion for New Trial is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Doty v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1982).
2. Was the Notice of Appeal Untimely thereby divesting this Court of Jurisdiction.
This is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320
(Utah 1982).
3. The trial court correctly found that no easement by necessity existed based on
Abraham Trust's failure to prove all of the elements of the claim. The Court's Findings of
4
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Fact are reviewed for clear error; its interpretation and application of the law of
easements by necessity is reviewed for correctness. Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App. 518,
127 P.3d 1224; Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, 112 P.3d 495.
4. The trial court correctly found no "intent" on the part of Abraham Trust's remote
grantors to grant to it's predecessors in interest an express easement for access to and
from it's property along an adjacent property. The Court's Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment are reviewed for clear error. Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App. 518, 127 P.3d
1224; Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, 112 P.3d 495.
5. The trial court correctly refused to reform the warranty deeds. The court's
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment in this regard are reviewed for clear error. Cowley
v. Porter, 2005 UT App. 518, 127 P.3d 1224; Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, 112 P.3d
495.
CITATIONS OF DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
1. Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987)
2. Rule 6(a), Utah R. Civ. P.
3. Rule 59(b), Utah R. Civ. P.
4. State v. Willey, 2011 UT App. 23
5. Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT app 95, 977 P. 2d 533
6. Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation, 555 P.2d 277
(Utah 1976).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Abraham Trust is the owner of a parcel of real property in Kane County, State of
Utah, situated to the east of County Road K-2000. Plaintiff filed this action on April 3,
2006 (R. 1-11) seeking a declaration of easement and right-of-way across two parcels of
real property lying between its' property and the adjacent public road, which properties
belong, respectively, to James M. Park and Tori L. Park, and to Dennis Carr and Donette
Carr.
On August 14, 2006, Plaintiff moved the court for summary judgment (R. 35-37).
In response, Defendants Dennis and Donette Carr stipulated to a decree of quiet title,
granting to Abraham Trust an express easement across their property (R. 83-86). Based
on the parties' stipulation and motion, the court entered an order of quiet title and
dismissal with respect to the Carr Defendants on October 6, 2006 (R. 149-152). Parks
resisted the motion. By Memorandum Decision dated November 28, 2006 (R. 156-163),
the trial court concluded Abraham Trust had failed to establish as a matter of law that
access across Park's property was "reasonably necessary".
On February 23, 2007, Abraham Trust renewed its motion for summary judgment,
submitting additional evidence concerning the reasonable necessity of easement rights.
(R. 164-166). Park responded with a competing motion for summary judgment (R. 253255). On January 14, 2008, the court issued its decision, again holding that a question of
fact existed concerning the "reasonable necessity" of Abraham Trust's proposed
easement across the Park property. (R. 400-405).
6
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This matter was tried to the court on January 26, 2010 (R. 625-626). Following a
presentation of evidence and argument of counsel, the court took the matter under
advisement. On March 8, 2010, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law (R. 627-639). In its Findings, the Court acknowledged the following:
a. Prior to August 1, 1964, Bertrand C. Smith and Idona J. Smith owned the
properties identified in the evidence as the North Property, the Watson
Property, the Trust Property, the Carr Property and the Park Property as a
single parcel (Findings of Fact at 13);
b. This single parcel had been accessed via a county road which bordered the
parcel and past through portions thereof (Findings of Fact No. 4);
c. On August 1, 1964, the Smiths conveyed a portion of the parcel, and retained
the balance (Findings of Fact atfflf5 and 6);
d. A portion of the Smith's property conveyed to RKR was thereafter divided
among Grantees B. Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson and Oliver D. LeFevre, who
in turn grantedeach other reciprocal easements (Findings of Fact atfflf7-13)1;
e. The Park Property was retained by Smiths, and conveyed by Paul and Gina
Harris to Defendants in 2001 (Findings of Fact at f 15).

At Conclusion of Law No. 4, the Court concluded Abraham Trust had not
established a right to easement by necessity based on the following:
a. "No witness testified as to conditions existent on August 1, 1964; the date of
severance;

1

While throughout the litigation the Abraham Trust attempted to prove severance between the
parcel retained by the Smith's and the Abraham Trust parcel, any severance between the Smith's
retained parcel was to the RKR parcel as a whole which at all times had access via the county
road. The relevant severance which resulted in the access issues before the Court was RKR's
subdivision of its property and conveyance of the Abraham Trust property.
7
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b. "The Court is unaware as to whether there was a road from the Trust Property
to the outer world as of August 1, 1964;
c. "Presumably no witness with knowledge or other evidence was available to the
trust regarding the conditions on the ground 45 years ago; at the time the
Smiths' severed the Park property from the property it sold to RKR;
d. "The Court thus cannot make a finding as to whether the 80-acre parcel
originally conveyed to RKR (of which the Trust Property is a part) was land
locked at the time of severance;
e. "Because the trust is the plaintiff in this action it bears the burden of proof;
f. "In the absence of such evidence this court is required to rule in favor of the
Parks on that issue;
g. "Under Utah law an easement by necessity is not created unless it 'clearly
appears that the parties to the conveyance did intend such an easement.';
h. "In this case Deed 4 B' contained a grant of a 30-foot easement from the county
road across the 240-acre RKR parcel to the northwest corner of the parcel
conveyed in Deed ' B';
i. "Because at the time of severance there were two deeds from the Smiths to RKR
(Deed 'A' and Deed 'B') rather than just one; and because the land in Deed
'B' was on the same day subsequently conveyed to the three individuals (B.
Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson and Oliver D. LeFevre); and because the 30-foot
easement granted in Deed 'B' went to the northwest corner of the property
conveyed in Deed 'B', Deed 'B' evidences clear intent on the part of the
parties to the severance that the express easement granted in deed 'B' was the
intended means of access to the 80-acre parcel conveyed in Deed 'B'."
(Conclusion of Law No. 4).

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on March 8, 2010. (R.
627-639). Judgment was thereafter entered on April 21, 2010 (R. 647-650). On
Wednesday May 5, 2010, Abraham Trust filed a Motion and Memorandum for New Trial
(R. 651-719). On January 3, 2011, the court denied Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial as
8
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having been filed untimely (R. 739-741). Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on January
7, 2011 (R. 742-743). To correct a typographical error, it amended its notice of appeal on
January 26, 2011 (R. 744-746).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Facts Admitted Prior to Trial.
Prior to trial, and pursuant to dispositive motions filed by Plaintiff as well as facts
admitted in discovery (all as presented at trial - see TR at 22-24), the following facts
were established as uncontroverted:
1. Abraham Trust owns a parcel of land located in Kane County, Utah, (the "Abraham
Trust Property").
2. Defendants Dennis Carr and Donette Carr ("the Carrs") also own a parcel of land
located in Kane County, Utah, (the "Carr Property").
3. Defendants James M. Park and Tori L. Park ("the Parks") are owners of a parcel of
land located in Kane County, Utah, (the "Park Property").
4. The Abraham Trust Property, the Carr Property, and the Park Property form three
contiguous parcels of land located to the west of Kane County Road No. K-2000
('County Road'):
a. The Park Property is immediately adjacent to the County Road.
b. The Carr Property is located to the west of the Park Property.
c. The Trust Property is located to the west of the Carr and the Park
Properties. The layout of the three properties vis-a-vis each other and the USGS
map of the region was illustrated on Exhibits 1-3 (TR at 30-35).
9
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5. Prior to August 1, 1964, the Trust, the Carr, and the Park Properties were all owned in
fee simple by Bertrand C. Smith and Idona J. Smith ('the Smiths').
6. Later, the Properties were conveyed to other owners. There were a number of transfers
over the years.
7. Abraham Trust became the owner of the Abraham Trust Property on August 2, 2006.
8. On December 21, 1965, the then-owners of the Carr Property conveyed an easement
across their property to the then-owners of the Abraham Trust Property. (See Right-ofWay Deed between Gary Smith and Barbara G. Smith as grantors and Oliver D. LeFevre
and Gary K. Watson as grantees.)
B. Facts Adduced at Trial.
At trial on January 26, 2010, testimony established the following additional facts:
1.

Abraham & Associates Trust is a trust organized and existing under the laws of the

State of Utah. Abraham Trust is currently the owner of the Abraham Trust Property. TR
at 26-28, 34-37, 44-48 and Exhs. 16-23.
2.

Prior to August 1, 1964, title in and to the Park Property, the Carr Property and the

Abraham Trust Property (as well as a parcel to the west of the Trust Parcel later deeded
to Mr. Gary K. Watson, hereafter "Watson Property") were held in fee simple interest
absolute by Bertrand C. Smith and Idona J. Smith (hereafter "Smiths"). TR at 23. On that
date, however, Smiths conveyed to RKR Construction Company all of their right, title
and interest in and to the Trust Property, the Watson Property and the Carr Property by

10
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deed of that date, recorded February 13, 1965 as Entry No. 00396, Book 015, Page 396,
Kane County Recorder ("RKR Deed"). TR at 37-38 and Exh. 4.
3.

At that time, there was a severance between the RKR properties and property

retained by Smith. (Tr. 37, 38, 41-42).
4.

At the time of the severance of the Smith's retained property and the property

conveyed to RKR, both parcels were accessible by the County Road. (Tr. 33).
5.

On the same date that the RKR Deed executed, Smiths conveyed to RKR

Construction Company all of their right, title and interest in and to the parcel of land to
the north of the Abraham Trust Property, the Watson Property and the Carr Property by
deed recorded April 29, 1965 as Entry No. 00030, Book 016, Page 30, Kane County
Recorder ("RKR North Deed"). TR at 73-75 and Exh. 27.
6.

The RKR North Deed was made "subject to a 30 foot right-of-way from the

Kane County Road to the NW corner of the N V2 of the SW 1/4, Section 19, Township 38
S, Range 8 W. Exh. 4.
7.

While, as drafted, the RKR North Deed is made subject to the described right-of-

way, nothing in the RKR Deed gives that property benefit of the right-of-way. Exhs. 4
and 27.
8.

In reviewing the two deeds, the following facts are apparent from their face:
a. Both deeds were prepared and signed on the same day, before the
same notary;
b. The right-of-way is described from calls within the southwest quarter of Section
19 where the property deed by the RKR Deed is located, rather than from the
11
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northwest quarter of the section, where the property deeded by the RKR North
Deed is located;
c. The property described in the RKR Deed is not adjacent to County Road K2000; the property described by the RKR North Deed, by contrast, is adjacent to
the county road, and requires no access thereto; and
d. Title to the RKR North Deed Property and the RKR Deed Property were all
vested in RKR Construction. TR at 74-79 and Exhs. 4 and 27.
9.

By deed recorded January 10, 1965, RKR Construction Company conveyed

all of its right, title and interest in and to the Carr Property, the Abraham Trust Property
and the Watson Property to B. Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson and Oliver D. LeFevre, as
tenants-in-common of all three properties. TR at 39 and Exh. 5.
10. This conveyance constituted the relevant severance of the property which resulted in
access issues, if any, to the Abraham Trust Property.
11.

The three transferees under this conveyance then quit claimed their interests in and

to portions of the conveyed property, such that Oliver D. LeFevre became sole owner, in
fee simple absolute, of the Abraham Trust Property; B. Gary Smith became sole owner,
in fee simple absolute, of the Carr Property; and Gary K. Watson became sole owner, in
fee simple absolute, of the Watson Property. TR at 40 and Exhs. 6-8.
12.

Said transferees further conveyed to each other reciprocal easement rights over

and across their respective parcels of property for the benefit of their neighboring
landowners. TR at 41 and Exhs. 9-11.
13. By stipulation, Plaintiff and the Carr Defendants have agreed that Plaintiff

12
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holds an express easement across the northernmost 30 feet of the Carr Property pursuant
to Exh. 10, and this Court has entered an order and judgment quieting title in and to that
easement in favor of Abraham Trust ("Carr Property Easement"). R. 83-86, 149-152.
14. As noted above, AbrahamTrust succeeded to primary beneficial interest in and to the
Abraham Trust Property by deed dated August 2, 2006 (TR at 43-48 and Exhs. 15-23),
and the Carr Defendants succeeded to primary beneficial interest in and to the Carr
Property - TR at 49-50 and Exh. 24.
15. Defendant Donette Carr is daughter to Bud Allen, Carrs' grantor of the Carr
Property under Quitclaim Deed dated April 6, 1998, recorded August 21, 1998 as Entry
No. 95443, Book 0176, Pages 682-6S3, Kane County Recorder. TR at 49, 102-103 and
Exh. 24.
16. In August of 1985, Idona J. Smith (then the sole surviving interest holder in
and to the Park Property) conveyed all of her right, title and interest in and to the Park
Property to Paul and Gina Harris. Said conveyance was by warranty deed dated August
12, 1985, and was recorded August 22, 1985 at Entry No. 55614, Book 086, Pages 454455, Kane County Recorder ("Harris Deed"). TR at 42 and Exh. 12.
17. This sale of the Park Property by Smith was long after its initial severance from the
RKR Properties wherein both the RKR Properties and the Park Property both had access
via the county road, and the relevant severance of the Abraham Trust Property by RKR
Construction which resulted in the access issues, if any.

13
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18. In 1970, Bud Allen, then owner of the Carr Property, purchased a 30-foot-wide
easement and right-of-way from the Idona R. Smith, Bertrand Gary Smith, Luna Diane
Smith Mitchell, Sylvia Karen Smith Bullock and lone J. Lambert (who at that time still
held primary beneficial interest in and to the Park Property) across the northernmost
thirty feet of the Park Property to its common border with the Carr Property. Said rightof-way was more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the center of Section 19, T38S, R8W, SLB&M, thence N
89°43' E 1151.7 ft.; thence S 0°17' E 30.0 ft.; thence S 89°43' W 1151.7
feet; thence N 0°17f W 30.0 ft. to the point of beginning and containing
0.793 acres more or less.
("Park Property Easement"). TR at 42 and Exh. 14.
19. Mr. Allen's conveyance, however, was restricted to use by his family and Invitees
including his daughter, Donette Carr. Exh. 14.
20. On April 16, 2001, Harrises conveyed their rights in and to the Park Property to
James M. Park and Tori L. Park. Said conveyance was by warranty deed dated April 16,
2001, and was recorded April 25, 2001 at Entry No. 105769, Book 0207, Pages 32-33,
Kane County Recorder ("Park Deed"). TR at 42, 100 and Exh. 13.
21. The Park Property Easement in favor of the Carr Property is occupied by a graded dirt
road providing physical access to the Park Property and limited legal access to the Carr
Property. TR at 51-52, 101-103 and Exh. 25. The road is currently level and straight,
providing access across the Park Property to the Carr Property. Exh. 25 at pp. 0087-0105.
22. There was some dispute about when the road along the Park Property Easement was
first installed, with Defendant James Park and witness John Eckert recalling its
14
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construction by Bud Allen in 1979-1980 (TR at 104, 144-145), and witness Donald
Stucker remembering use of the road in the mid-1970s (TR at 118-119). It was
undisputed, though, that the road needed to be built up due to the rutted, marshy quality
of the ground surrounding it by virtue of natural springs. TR at 58-59, 122 and Exh. 25.
23. Plaintiffs representative, S. Mark Hulet, testified he had searched the record of the
Abraham Trust Property discovering no legal right of access to the Abraham Trust
Property via the adjacent county road, existing at any time after Smith's conveyed away
the Trust Property to RKR retaining for themselves the Park Property. TR at 50, 62, 7273,82-83,96.
24. Mr. Park acknowledged he knew of no legal avenue of access to the Trust Property
from the adjacent county road. TR at 139.
25. According to testimony of Plaintiff s representative, Mark Hulet, access to the trust
property over the RKR property requires navigating obstacles. TR at 58-59, and Exhs 3
and 25 pp. 0093-0107.
26. Mr. Hulet admitted the Abraham Trust Property could be accessed across the RKR
property although it was dangerous. TR at 60-64 and Exh. 25 at pp. 0101-0109.
27. Witness Donald Stucker testified of the existence and one-time usability of a road to
the Trust Property through North Fork Estates. TR at 120-123.
28. John Eckert testified of additional roads to the Trust Property across the RKR North
Property, which were later blocked. TR at 148-154.

15
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29. James Park testified that, when he purchased the Park Property in 2001, he found the
road across the Park Property Easement in existence, but impassible - that he had to cut
down trees in the summer of 2001-2002 to make the road passable. TR at 101-103.
30. Trust representative S. Mark Hulet confirmed Mr. Stacker's testimony that the ATV
switchback road up from North Fork Estates had become impassible except by ATV. TR
at 68-72.
31. The roadway crossing the Park Property Easement has not been graded or improved
all the way to the Abraham Trust Property, and would require additional engineering and
grading work. TR at 92-94.
32. Park testified that, on one day, he had travelled across the RKR North Property from
a point north of the junction between County Road K 2000 and the Park Property
Easement to a point on the Carr Property Easement, and presented photographs of
portions of the route. TR at 129-135 and Exhs. 28-43.
33. No witness at trial testified as to the necessity of an access easement between the
Abraham Trust Property and the adjacent county road on August 1, 1964, there being no
living individual available to so testify.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly concluded Abraham Trust's motion for new trial, served
and filed on May 3, 2010, was untimely. As such, the Notice of Appeal was also
untimely. Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction and must dismiss this appeal.
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In addition, Abraham Trust failed to marshal the evidence. Because of this failure,
this Court must affirm the trial court's findings of fact, including the finding Abraham
Trust failed to meet its burdens of proof regarding the element of reasonable necessity.
Assuming Abraham Trust met its marshalling burden, the evidence clearly
supported the Court's findings. Further, its conclusions of law were not erroneous. The
Court found Abraham Trust failed to meet its burdens with respect to access at the time
of the alleged severance. As such, the Court concluded Abraham Trust could not prevail
on the easement by necessity claim. While the evidence in fact showed that at one time,
there was unity of title, said unity was severed by the conveyance to RKR Construction
of two parcels evidenced by Deeds A and B. However, the evidence further showed that
the County Road touched both the RKR Deed property as well as the property retained by
Smith. Therefore, at the time of this severance, both the RKR properties and the retained
Smith property had access. Thereafter, with the property vested in RKR, it was RKR
which severed the applicable unity of title resulting in any access issues related to the
Abraham Trust Property. Therefore, the Court correctly found and concluded that
Abraham Trust failed to meet its burden of proof.
The trial court properly found Abraham Trust had the obligation to establish
necessity at the time of severance of the unity of title vis-a-vis the Park Property which
was retained by the Smiths. Abraham Trust failed to prove this element.
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Finally, the Court properly concluded that reformation of the deeds was improper.
Abraham Trust failed to meet its burden of proof to establish the requisite intent
necessary to establish a right to reformation.
This Court should affirm the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
Judgment and Order Denying Abraham Trust's Motion for a New Trial as untimely. In
addition, it should dismiss this appeal based on lack of jurisdiction as the Notice of
Appeal was also untimely.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THIS APPEAL BASED ON LACK OF
JURISDICTION BECAUSE BOTH THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND
NOTICE OF APPEAL WERE UNTIMELY
In its Order of January 3, 2011, the trial court denied Abraham Trust's Motion for a
New Trial without reaching the merits of the motion. (R. 739-741). Specifically, the
Court stated,
In this case the motion for new trial was filed more than ten days after the
entry of judgment. Under Utah Supreme Court's holding in Burgers v.
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982)], this Court's only alternative is
to deny the motion.
Order of January 3, 2011, at p. 2 (R. 740). The Court's ruling was correct and should be
affirmed.
The trial Court entered judgment in this matter on Wednesday, April 21, 2010 (R.
647-650). Abraham Trust's Motion for a New Trial was filed with the trial court on May
5,2010. (R. 651-653).
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Under Rule 59(b), Utah R. Civ. P., "a motion for a new trial shall be served not
later than ten days after the entry of judgment." Given that the judgment in this matter
was entered on Wednesday, April 21, 2010, the tenth calendar date following entry was
Saturday, May 1, 2010. Pursuant to Rule 6(a), Utah R. Civ. P., the last day of any filing
period provided by the rules is to be counted in the computation of the period "unless it is
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of
the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday." Thus, Abraham Trust
had until Monday, May 3, 2010, in which to file its motion. It did not. Rather, the Motion
was filed with the trial court on May 5, 2010. R. 651-653.
When reviewing a Motion for New Trial, the standard of review is that this Court
will not overturn the trial court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial under Rule 59
absent "a manifest abuse of discretion." Doty v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 P.2d 993, 995
(Utah 1982). The general rule concerning abuse of discretion is that the appellate court
"will presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the
record clearly shows to the contrary." Goddardv. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah
1984), quoted with approval in Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 748 P.2d
1067, 1068 (Utah 1987).
As noted in the case of Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982), "Under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b), a party must serve a motion for a newr trial on the
opposing party within ten days from the entry of judgment." Id. While Abraham Trust
argues its Rule 59(b) Motion for New Trial was timely, both the Utah cases and some
19
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federal cases found otherwise. In Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987), the
Court stated, "If, for example, the motion is properly characterized as one for a new trial,
it must be filed within ten days. Utah R.Civ.P. 59(b)." Id at 1320. In Kurth v. Wiarda,
1999 UT App 153,1J6, 981 P.2d 417, the Court said, "The timeliness of a . . . Rule 59
motion is governed by the rules themselves. Such motions must be served or filed not
later than ten days after the entry of the judgment." See also Regan v. Blount, 1999 UT
App 154, 978 P.2d 1051. In Seyler v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp., Civil Action
No. 99-2342-KHV (Kan. 2000), the Court stated,
Plaintiffs motion for new trial is also time-barred. Any motion for a new trial must
be filed no later than ten days after entry of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b).
The Court cannot extend the deadline to file a new trial motion. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6(b). Plaintiff filed her motion for new trial on June 28, 2000, twelve days after
judgment had been entered. Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for new trial is
untimely.
Id. In the instant case, the Abraham Trust did not file its Motion for a New Trial within
ten days are required by the express provisions of the rule.
A strict construction of the rule is warranted. Because a Motion for a New Trial
tolls the time for appeal, strict compliance with the rule's requirements fosters both the
finality of judgments and affords the litigants a firm and set time frame from which to
appeal the trial court's judgment. It is in a sense a condition precedent to tolling the
limitation period for filing a notice of appeal. Just as the filing requirements for a Notice
of Appeal are strictly construed, so too should the condition precedent to tolling that time.
The trial court correctly ruled that the Motion for a New Trial was not timely. It
appropriately denied the motion.
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Moreover, because the Motion for a New Trial was not timely, it did not toll the
time for filing the Notice of Appeal. An untimely motion for a new trial does not "toll
the time for taking an appeal." Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982). If
the notice of appeal is not timely, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the
appeal and has no choice but to dismiss the appeal. See Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth.,
2000 UT App 299, f 7,13 P.3d 616.
In the instant case, the Court entered its Judgment on April 21, 2010. The thirtieth
(30th) day which was the last day to file the Notice of Appeal was Friday, May 21, 2010.
Abraham Trust did not file its Notice of Appeal until January 7, 2011 (R. 742-743). To
correct a typographical error, it amended its notice of appeal on January 26, 2011 (R.
744-746). In either case, the Notice of Appeal was untimely. This Court therefore lacks
jurisdiction and must dismiss this appeal.
II. ABRAHAM TRUST FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
Abraham Trust's brief is woefully deficient with respect to its obligation to marshal
the evidence. After setting forth thirty nine (39) separate fact paragraphs, it contains a
"marshalling" section containing only eight (8) paragraphs marshaled in favor of the trial
court's decision.
On appeal, the burden to marshal is high. As stated in State v. Willey, 2011 UT App
23:
[T]he marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to merely have pertinent
excerpts from the record readily available to a reviewing court. The marshaling
process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate
himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position.
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In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced . . . which supports the very findings the appellant resists.
After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous. The marshaling requirement is not satisfied if
parties just list all the evidence presented at trial, or simply rehash the arguments
on evidence they presented at trial.
Id. at 9 quoting Kimball v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233, If 21, 217 P.3d 733 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In the instant brief, Abraham Trust has entirely failed to meet its burden to
marshal the evidence. The consequences of this failure to marshal is this Court must
accept the facts as found by the District Court as true. See Burton Lumber & Hardware
Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, If 13 186 P.3d 1012 (n[B]ecause [the appellant] makes
no real attempt to properly marshal the evidence, we accept all the trial court's
findings.1'). As such, all challenges to the trial court's findings of fact must be denied.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND NO EASEMENT BY
NECESSITY EXISTED BASED ON ABRAHAM TRUST'S FAILURE
TO PROVE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM

The doctrine of easement by necessity was addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in
the case of Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation, 555 P.2d 277
(Utah 1976). Therein, the Court stated that "...a way of necessity arises when there is a
conveyance of a part of a tract of land which is so situated that either the part conveyed
or the part retained is surrounded with no access to a road to the outer world." Id. at 280
[emphasis supplied]. Tschaggeny made clear an easement by necessity was established
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by the existence of two factors: "(1) Unity of title, followed by severance; and (2) That
the easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate..." Id.
While Abraham Trust has properly set forth the elements of an easement by necessity,
Tschaggeny is not dispositive of the issues before this Court. While the trial court's
decision rested on the failure of Abraham Trust to establish the easement was reasonably
necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant estate, there is another ground upon which
to affirm the trial court's decision.
Tschaggeny makes clear that the threshold issue is unity of title and severance.
However, a review of Tschaggeny as well as other cases reveal additional implicit
requirements. First, as in Tschaggeny, before an easement by necessity can arise, it must
do so out of the severance of the property immediately preceded by the unity of title. In

,

Tschaggeny, the grantor held unity of title. Thereafter, title was severed. But it was this
conveyance severing title which resulted in the easement by necessity because either the
conveyed or retained property was surrounded with no access to a road to the outer
world. Id. at 281-82. Thus, the relevant severance must consider the conveyed and
retained parcels vis-a-vis each other. Absent a grant which both conveys and retains, no

i

way of necessity can arise over the retained property.
In the instant case, it is admitted that the Smith's held unity of title to both all property
i
conveyed to RKR and it retained the Park Property. (Tr. 37, 38, 41, 42). However, this
2

A simply survey of Utah easement by necessity cases finds a similar vis-a-vis requirement. See e.g.
Boyington v. Glenn, 2002 UT App 194, fn. 1; Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, 977 P.2d 533; and
Savage v. Nielsen et al.} 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117 (1948).
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severance is neither the relevant severance nor did it result in either party (the conveyed
nor retained) being surrounded with no access to a road to the outer world. Instead,
because RKR owned both RKR parcels (RKR Deed and RKR North Deed) one of which
was contiguous to the County Road, they were not surrounded with no access to a road to
the outer world. (Tr. 58). Further, the Park Property retained by Smiths was also
contiguous to the County Road. (Tr. 23). Therefore, at the time of the severance of the
Park Property from the RKR properties evidenced by the RKR Deed and RKR North
Deed, neither property was surrounded without access to a road to the outer world.
It was not however, the irrelevant Smith severance upon which Abraham Trust relied.
Instead, it was the subsequent severance of the RKR properties which resulted in the
Abraham Trust Property being surrounded without access to a road to the outer world.
The Park Property was neither conveyed nor retained in the relevant severance.
It is undisputed that Smiths held unity of title. However, it is not Smith's unity
which is relevant. The evidence showed that prior to August 1, 1964, title in and to the
Park Property, the Carr Property and the Abraham Trust Property (as well as a parcel to
the west of the Trust Parcel later deeded to Mr. Gary K. Watson, hereafter "Watson
Property") were held in fee simple interest absolute by Bertrand C. Smith and Idona J.
Smith (hereafter "Smiths"). TR at 23. On that date, however, Smiths conveyed to RKR
3

The Court should note that while RKR still owns property which is contiguous to both the County Road
and the Abraham Trust Property, which could afford Abraham Trust Property access to the County Road,
for inexplicable reasons, Abraham Trust did no sue RKR to establish an easement by necessity over RKR
retained property, which property was specifically part of the severance of the RKR Properties and
resulted in the conveyance of the Abraham Trust Property.
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Construction Company all of their right, title and interest in and to the Trust Property, the
Watson Property and the Carr Property by deed of that date, recorded February 13, 1965
as Entry No. 00396, Book 015, Page 396, Kane County Recorder ("RKR Deed"). TR at
37-38 and Exh. 4. On the same date that the RKR Deed executed, Smiths conveyed to
RKR Construction Company all of their right, title and interest in and to the parcel of
land to the north of the Abraham Trust Property, the Watson Property and the Carr
Property by deed recorded April 29, 1965 as Entry No. 00030, Book 016, Page 30, Kane
County Recorder ("RKR North Deed"). TR at 73-75 and Exh. 27. The RKR Deed and
RKR North Deed are collectively referred to as the "RKR Properties". Smith retained

{

title to what ultimately became the Park Property, selling that interest in August of 1985.
TR at 42 and Exh. 12. While there was a severance of the Park Property (retained by
Smith) and the RKR Properties, both at all times were contiguous to the County Road and
not without access to the outer world.
i

By deed recorded January 10, 1965, RKR Construction Company conveyed all of its
right, title and interest in and to the Carr Property, the Abraham Trust Property and the
Watson Property to B. Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson and Oliver D. LeFevre, as tenants-

(

in-common of all three properties. TR at 39 and Exh. 5. It was only this conveyance,
which severed the unity of RKR title to the property, which resulted in property retained
i
in RKR and conveyed to Abraham Trust's predecessor in interest, LeFevre. Thus, the
relevant vis-a-vis grant was not the Smith to RKR grant but rather only the RKR to
LeFevre grant. It was the unity of title in RKR which was severed by its conveyance to
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LeFevre et al which resulted in the conveyance of property which had no access to the
outer world, not the Smith to RKR grant. The Park Property was a stranger to the
conveyance between RKR and LeFevre.
In addition, the trial court properly found that Abraham Trust failed to establish the
element of reasonable necessity at the time of the severance. The Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in relevant part, states:
"The Court is unaware as to whether there was a road from the Trust Property to the
outer world as of August 1, 1964;
"Presumably no witness with knowledge or other evidence was available to the trust
regarding the conditions on the ground 45 years ago; at the time the Smiths' severed
the Park property from the property it sold to RKR;
"The Court thus cannot make a finding as to whether the 80-acre parcel originally
conveyed to RKR (of which the Trust Property is a part) was land locked at the time
of severance;
"Because the trust is the plaintiff in this action it bears the burden of proof;
"In the absence of such evidence this court is required to rule in favor of the Parks on
that issue;
(R. 627-639). In short, without evidence concerning whether the conveyed property was
without access to a road to the outer world at the time of severance, the Court could not
find an easement by necessity.
This finding is in accordance with the precedent regarding easements by necessity.
As correctly stated by the Court in Savage v. Nielsen et al, 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117
(1948), "A way of necessity arises from the existence of such necessity at the time of the
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dividing of the property." Id. at 33. Thus, the Court properly required evidence of the
necessity at the time of the relevant severance.
With respect to the Smith severance of the RKR Properties, there was evidence of
the lack of necessity. The evidence showed that the RKR Properties were both owned by
the same entity and that one of said properties was contiguous to the County Road. (Tr.
58). It is foolery and absurd to argue RKR would preclude itself from accessing part of
its property, regardless of whether that property was acquired through two separate deeds.
Thus, access to one parcel constituted access to both. At the time of the Smith irrelevant
severance, there was no necessity. Abraham Trust also failed to put on any evidence
regarding necessity at the time of the relevant RKR severance. Regardless, Abraham
Trust failed to introduce the required evidence to support the element of necessity at the
time of either severance. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled Abraham Trust failed to
meet its burden of proof.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND AN EASEMENT BY
NECESSITY WAS DEFEATED BY A CONTRARY INTENT OF THE
REMOTE GRANTOR.
The Trial Court's second Conclusion of Law concerning Plaintiffs claim of
easement by necessity invokes language from the Tschaggeny decision to the effect that
the creation of an easement by necessity may be defeated by evidence of a contrary intent
in the common grantor. In its Findings of Fact, the Court noted that, on the same day that
it conveyed the property which would become the Watson Property, the Trust Property
and the Carr Property (by Deed 396, Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, referred to by the Court's
27
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ruling as "Deed A"), Smiths also conveyed the North Property (by Deed 00030,
Plaintiffs Exhibit 27, which the Court referred to as "Deed B"), and which contained the
following language:
The above property is subject to a 30-foot right-of-way from the Kane
County Road to the NW comer of the N lA of the SW V*, Section 19,
Township 38S, Range 8W.
The Court concluded, at paragraph 4(B) of its Conclusions of Law, that the presence of
this language in the deed to the North Property evidenced an intent by Smiths to convey
an easement over the RKR North Property to Plaintiffs predecessor in interest, which
defeats Plaintiffs claim of easement by necessity across the Park Property.
This finding is both supported by the evidence and irrelevant to this Court's
determination of the issues. First, the evidence indisputably established that the RKR
North Deed contained an express easement. The intent which may be inferred from this
express easement was that access to the RKR properties was expressly provided both by
their contiguous location with the County Road and a redundant express easement.
Clearly, the Smith grantors intended that all of the RKR Properties would have access to
the County Road through the RKR Property conveyed by Smith. It pales the imagination
to think Smith contemplated RKR precluding itself from accessing its property.
Regardless, because the Smith conveyance is not the relevant severance, whether
an express easement was created or intended is irrelevant. The facts clearly establish that
at the time of the Smith severance, the RKR Properties were not without access to a road
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to the outer world. Therefore, whether the Court relied on an apparent intent to create an
express easement is irrelevant and has no bearing on the outcome of this action.
V. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO REFORM THE
DEEDSReformation is a remedy available to a court sitting equity, to correct mistakes in
deeds and other instruments of conveyance where a preponderance of the evidence
establishes that the instruments do not reflect the grantor's intent. See generally West One
Trust Company v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah App. 1993); Haslem v. Ottosen,
689 P.2d 27, 30 (Utah 1984); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 155 (1979).
However, in the instant action, just as Abraham Trust failed to produce evidence of
necessity at the time of conveyance, it similarly failed to put on evidence regarding the
Smith's intent sufficient to permit reformation.
As a preliminary matter, Parks remind this Court that somehow Abraham Trust urged
both the trial court and this Court to find Smith's intent literally decades apart. The
Smith conveyance of the RKR Properties occurred in August, 1964. (Tr. 37 and Ex. 4).
The Smith conveyance to Harris, Parks' predecessor in interest occurred in August, 1985.
Thus, somehow, Abraham Trust believes the evidence was sufficient to glean Smith's
intent in two separate transactions, literally twenty one (21) years apart. There simply
was no evidence from which the trial court could ascertain Smith's intent.
In addition, Smith's intent regarding the Park Property is not relevant. The Abraham
Trust Property was a stranger to the deed between Smith and Harris, Parks' predecessor
in interest. In Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, If 12, 977 P.2d 533, the Court stated
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"Utah law prohibits parties from expressly creating an easement in a land transaction for
the benefit of a third party who is not involved in the transaction — i.e., a "stranger to the
deed.1". As stated by the Court in Wells Fargo Bank v. Mowery, 187 Ohio App.3d 268,
2010-Ohio-1650, 931 N.E.2d 1121 (2010), a stranger to a deed or contract has no right to
seek reformation. See also Jordan v. Shea, 2002 ME 36, f21, 791 A.2d 116; and
Moseley v. Interfinancial Mgmt., 224 Ga. App. 80, 479 S.E.2d 427 (1996). Thus, as a
stranger to the deed between Smith and Harris, Parks' predecessor in interest, Abraham
Trust had no right to reform deeds to which it was a stranger.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision in its entirety. The trial court
correctly ruled that Abraham Trust's Motion for New Trial was untimely. Because the
Motion for New Trial was untimely so too was the Notice of Appeal. Thus, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal which must be dismissed. The trial court correctly
found that no easement by necessity existed based on Abraham Trust's failure to prove
all of the elements of the claim. The relevant severance was not the Smith vis-a-vis RKR
conveyance, but rather the RKR severance to Abraham Trust's predecessor in interest.
The trial court correctly refused to reform the warranty deeds. Abraham Trust was a
stranger to the deed it sought to reform.
Therefore, this Court should either dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction or
alternatively affirm the trial court.
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